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Яремчук С.М.

Національний університет «Львівська політехніка»

### **СПІВВІДНОШЕННЯ РЕЛІГІЇ І МОРАЛІ В НІМЕЦЬКІЙ КЛАСИЧНІЙ ФІЛОСОФІЇ (ІММАНУЇЛ КАНТ, ЛЮДВІГ ФОЄРБАХ)**

*У статті виявлено особливості тлумачень мислителями Нового часу основних категорій моральної і релігійної свідомості (благо, віра, істина, любов, мораль, спасіння, чеснота та ін.) в їх взаємозв'язку. Звернення до історико-генетичного методу і методу категоріального аналізу дозволило розкрити філософський зміст основних концепцій взаємозв'язку релігії і моралі в новочасній культурі і виявити їх причетність до процесів, що відбуваються в європейському духовному просторі сьогодення. Отримані результати надають можливість подальшого теоретичного опрацювання багатой ідейної спадщини Нового часу і пошуків вирішення практичних завдань щодо формування моральних засад людського життя в епоху гострої духовної кризи сучасного європейського світу.*

*Ключові слова: благодать, віра, істина, любов, мораль, релігія, чеснота, чистота.*

*Яремчук С.М. Соотношение религии и морали в немецкой классической философии (Иммануил Кант, Людвиг Фейербах) / Национальный университет «Львовская политехника», Украина, Львов*

*В статье выявлено особенности истолкований мыслителями Нового времени основных категорий морального и религиозного сознания (благо, вера, истина, любовь, мораль, спасение, добродетель и др.) в их взаимосвязи. Обращение к историко-генетическому методу и методу категориального анализа позволило раскрыть философское содержание основных концепций взаимосвязи религии и морали Нового времени и выявить их причастность к процессам, происходящим в европейском духовном пространстве современности.*

*Полученные результаты дают возможность дальнейшего исследования богатого идейного наследия Нового времени и поисков решения практических задач по формированию нравственных оснований человеческой жизни в эпоху острого духовного кризиса современного европейского мира.*

*Ключевые слова: благодать, вера, добродетель, истина, любовь, мораль, религия, чистота.*

*Yaremchuk S. M. Corellation of religion and morality in german classical philosophy (Immanuel Kant, Ludwig Feuerbach) / Lviv Polytecnic National University, Ukraine, Lviv*

*The article shows the development of specific of interpretations the main categories of Moral and Religious Conciousness in the New Ages (faith, grace, love, morality, purity, religion, truth, virtue). Historical and genetic method and method of category analyses gives the possibilities to uncover the philosophical sense of the main conceptions of New Ages of correlation Morality and Religion and to develop their relation with the process in the European spiritual spread of our days.*

*The results of this study allow to make further searches of rich intellectual inheritance of New Ages and to search for the decision the practical problems of moral bases of people's life in the time of the hard spiritual crisis of modern European world.*

*Keywords: faith, grace, love, morality, purity, religion, truth, virtue.*

*Introduction.*

The Renaissance humanism and New Age accepted the idea of exceptional human dignity in Christianity. Specificity of New Age was the desire to justify the value of the human person apart from religion. And while Christianity insists on the primacy of transcendental, suprapersonal realities, New Age puts this reality into the human subject. While in the Middle Ages, even non-religious morality was subject of religion, in the era of New Age even religious morality was the output of the human person. True morality within the person and the value of its virtues were associated with the fact of free, independent and informed choice of the individual.

I. Kant claims and justifies the final and complete priority of moral over all other areas of the human spirit. Philosopher puts the problem of balance of morality and religion with the utmost, hitherto unprecedented clarity. “Morality in its purity and whiteness should be linked with religion, that wasn’t comprehended by the ancient philosophers” [5, p. 94]. He implemented a truly grand plan of moral autonomy, subordinating all human activity to the task of moral self-improvement and education of the individual. According to I. Kant, knowledge hasn’t got value unless it helps a person to realize good in his life. Faith is justified only if it helps to follow duty everywhere and always. Kant affirmed the autonomy of morality. “Morality does not require religion, by pure practical reason it tends to itself” [6, p. 261]. However, for Kant, mere human efforts aren’t enough to fully realize the vision of the supreme good, which morality includes. One must “posit the existence of God as that referring to the possibility of the supreme good” [3, p. 377]. All moral precepts would have no power if it were not a perfect being who perceives them. “Religion provides morality with strength, beauty and reality, because morality itself is something perfect... Religion is what gives moral weight; it should be the motive for morality” [5, p. 94]. Morality would remain in the noumenal world, if it were not a Creature that makes morality in its entirety. “It is also impossible to appeal to morality without believing in God” [5, p. 94]. Religion is embodied morality, its strength.

According to I. Kant, the real guarantee of moral world order can only be God. Existence of God that isn’t proved by any theoretical arguments of reason is a postulate of practical reason” [1, p. 321]. Knowledge – both in morality, and in religion – isn’t of decisive importance. “I had to eliminate the knowledge to make space for faith” [4, p. 43]. Taking away from the mind claims to transcendental knowledge (to excessive generalization), Kant thus vacated the seat to faith. “Dogmatism of metaphysics, i.e. prejudice that it’s possible to succeed in it without the critique of pure reason, is the true source of disbelief (contrary to morality), which is always highly dogmatic” [4, p. 43]. Not faith is dogmatic, but mind that claims to knowledge beyond experience. Critique of pure reason, Kant believes, “puts

the end to all attacks against morality and religion” [4, p. 43]. Separating, on the one hand, the field of knowledge, and, on the other hand, the field of morality and religion, he thus has limited knowledge that it would not play a decisive role in morality and religion.

God is not a matter of reason, but the condition of morality. God is neither the source nor the cause of morality. According to Kant, God is a hypothesis. “God is not a creature beyond me, but just my opinion” [2, p. 376]. Thus understandable God is not an external authority to humans and is recognized as a condition of morality that is the very possibility of moral acts. “It’s not so important for us to know what God Himself is (by nature) as what He is for us as a moral being” [6, p. 370]. I. Kant considers the existence of God not in the cognitive, but in a purely moral context. According to Kant, it would be immoral to treat God as anthropomorphic being, thus humiliating Him. The only thing to be pious is the attitude toward God as holy legislator, benevolent ruler and righteous judge. According to Kant, these moral properties of God are needed as much as they may give great efficiency to moral qualities. Knowledge of God as a moral being is the essence of theology of natural religion.

The idea of moral purity and religious experience from empirical principles is, so to speak, a nerve of Immanuel Kant’s philosophy. The principles of pleasure, benefits, profit, and happiness are not acceptable to justify morality. His ethics of duty confronts empirical ethics. Only an act which is motivated by duty can be considered truly moral. Purity of moral motives is unbreakable. I. Kant understands the limitations of reason in justification for the idea of pure morality, as well as in resolving moral and religious issues, and therefore he justifies the importance of faith to morality and religion. “Faith in God, which, as a practical faith, derived from the principle of morality is so powerful that no speculative counterproofs are able to wrest it from the moral sense” [5, p. 93]. Faith is inevitably mentioned in human behaviour, where the need is not thinking, but action in accordance with the ideal. Reason for Kant, can not give such unshakable foundation, since it’s connected with

contradictions, and moral action requires absolute rather than problematic belief in the rightness of actions undertaken.

In morality and religion, Kant attached the utmost importance to the faith. “As the man himself can not realize the idea of the highest good, inextricably linked with the purely moral direction of thoughts, he finds for himself necessary belief in assistance or existence of moral world-keeper, only through which this goal is possible” [6, p. 370]. And if faith has subordinate position in knowledge, in religion and morality it is indispensable. According to Kant, there are three kinds of faith. Pragmatic faith is a faith of man in his innocence in a particular case. Doctrinal belief is a belief in the general provisions, or otherwise, the faith of reason. These kinds of faith, according to Kant, are unstable and contingent. A moral belief has quite a different character – “nothing can shake it, because of moral principles that would be rejected in such a way” [4, p. 600]. Kant puts faith in God dependent on morality. To believe in God means not to think about his existence, but to strive to be good. Kant valued knowledge more than dogmatic and doctrinal belief, but he put moral faith above knowledge, thus assuring the primacy of practical reason over theoretical. Only pure religious faith or otherwise, faith of reason, according to Kant, can serve as a basis for true religion, because it might be clearly informed to anyone who has a mind.

I. Kant distinguishes between the concept of “faith” and “religion”. There is only one true religion, but there may be different types of faith. Therefore it’s more appropriate to say “a man of a particular faith” instead of “a man of a particular religion”. Church faith is historically conditioned. But this isn’t for pure faith of reason, which is the basis of moral religion. Historical faith, says Kant, has got pure religious faith as its supreme interpreter. Kant spread the idea of “pure morality”, free from everything empirical, on the religion as well. Purity of religious experience is possible only with pure morality. In this regard, Kant defines the Church as an association of people “based only on moral rather than any other motives” [6, p. 336]. Religion, by its content, is no different from morality. The purpose of religion of

reason is “moral perfection of man” [6, p. 345]. There are just different kinds of faith, but religion is one as the only and true morality.

Morality can not be derived from religion, because it precedes religion. Religion begins with a man and appears where there is a relation of man to God. Yet, says Kant, there are religions without morality. “There is no morality, but prudence and diligence of prudent conduct towards God” [5, p. 92]. He formulates problem of the correlation of morality and religion as a kind of moral problem: “morality should be linked with religion” [5, p. 94]. They are linked not in existential, but in the proper being. They are separated, but must be linked. Religion that does not involve morality reduces only to the outer ministry. Distinguishing “external” and “internal” religion, or in other words “religion of ceremonies” and “religion of mood”, Kant denies that the first one has the right to be called religion. “External actions can be either internal means of religion, or the consequences of it, but the outer religion is nonsense” [5, p. 95]. True religion is “the religion of mood”, or otherwise “moral religion”. Religion necessarily involves moral and pure religion is actually “moral religion”, which is the knowledge of “all our commitments as divine commandments” [6, p. 380]. Exactly such a natural religion, according to Kant, should be completion of morality. It is the awareness of duty as divine commandments. It’s complemented with “the religion of revelation”, which, however, understands the divine commandments as a duty.

Religion of revelation and natural religion are not opposed to each other but complement each other. “Natural religion can be, at the same time, the religion of revelation” [6, p. 382]. Both of them posit proper life, coming to it from all sides. Awareness of the divine commandments as a duty and awareness of duty as divine commandments are essentially the same. Here it is important not how a person comes to the idea of duty, through reason or through faith in God, but it is important that he understands the proper and aspires to establish it in life. “Supernatural religion is an addition of natural one by higher divine help” [5, p. 96]. Natural religion is true, but incomplete, since it always implies only limited human effort to attain fullness of life. At the same time, only our moral behaviour makes us worthy of God’s help. Supernatural religion, taken by itself, is something passive. It implies that God is

doing all instead of man, and man has no need to do something, because everything will happen without his participation. Then I. Kant concludes that if morality should be present in the actions, supernatural religion must be preceded by natural religion.

Unlike I. Kant, L. Feuerbach refuses to withdraw morality and religion of transcendental principles. He goes against the “insensible” morality separated from a particular individual, and transfers its source on a real person. Morality is a real practical relation of one person to another. L. Feuerbach denies the possibility of the output morality of mind without correlation with feelings. Morality is not possible without the Kantian “autonomy”, but it does not exist without interpersonal relationship either. Another person is not an abstraction or scheme. Feuerbach defends the idea of a real, not an abstract man. He rejects the “absolute, immaterial speculation that draws material from itself” [8, p. 17], and affirms “the reality of being a single sense” [7, p. 79]. Along with the “speculative” morality Feuerbach also rejects speculative theology, which, in his opinion, opposes God as transcendent essence to human nature. God, spirit, soul are the empty abstractions for him. He proves that “the true meaning of theology is anthropology” and that “there is no difference between the divine and the human subject or nature – they are identical” [8, p. 21]. God is for Feuerbach the nature of man, not only alienation and objectification. Or, in other words, God is a kind of symbolic image of a purely human characteristics and qualities.

L. Feuerbach rejects God as a transcendent entity, but not religion. “To be without religion is to think only of oneself; to have religion means to think about the others”. He wants to improve religion, not to cancel it. The true essence of religion lies in the nature of man. Religion is “the direct nature of man”. Feuerbach considers religion the necessary and logical step in the formation of human self-consciousness, his generic feature, for the animals don’t have religion. The fact that the gods were created in the image and likeness of people is the root of content and value of religious consciousness, the basis of its reality in history. God, according to Feuerbach, is the essence of man. Religion encourages loving God. So religion preaches eventually love man to man, which is the essence of morality. Religion is

nothing other than morality. L. Feuerbach defends a religion without God, religion of the love of man to man.

The essence of morality is the love of man to man. Feuerbach rejects the Christian thesis that “God is love”. He believes that religion is essentially immoral – not only in some of its manifestations. If love is the essence of religion, faith is its conscious form. Love identifies a person and God, and therefore man and man, combines them. And faith separates God from man, and therefore man from man, thus – separates them. Faith, in fact, is immoral. “Faith by its nature is bound and limited” [8, p. 288], it is always a belief in something definite, the only true. Faith involves fanaticism and intolerance towards all infidels. “So faith assimilates only believers and repels unbelievers. It is good towards believers and wicked towards non-believers” [8, p. 290]. Faith, according to Feuerbach, cannot be a criterion to distinguish between good and evil, because it is unstable and is based on a random feeling or mood. Randomness generally is the main subject of religion. Religion is something unintentional and involuntary, something independent from human knowledge and will, but at the same time – something that determined the fate of a person.

Faith, according to Feuerbach, inevitably turns into hatred, and hatred in pursuit, unless meets on its way restrictions in the form of morality. Faith considers itself above the laws of morality. “For faith there is nothing above itself, because its object is the divine personality” [8, p. 299]. Therefore, it makes achieving supreme bliss dependent on itself, not on performing common functions. Man, according to Feuerbach, is facing unresolved dilemma, because he has to sacrifice “both love for the personality of God and the personality of God for the sake of love” [8, p. 302]. Religion is opposed to morality, because faith is the opposite of love. “For faith man is exhausted by faith. Only faith contains all the virtues that make us pleasing to God” [8, p. 292]. Faith cancels moral and limits love. “Love in Christianity is contaminated by faith; it is not taken freely and in pure form. Love limited by faith isn’t real love” [7, p.117]. In this sense, love is identical with the mind only, not with faith, because mind and love are general in nature, and faith is always limited.

Only for love Feuerbach reserves the right to be the basis of morality and religion. Love unites morality and religion. „Love is a connection, an intermediary between perfect and imperfect, sinful and sinless, general and individual, the law and the heart, God and human. Love is God Himself, and there is no God out of love“ [8, p. 79]. Love to man should be the supreme law for man. To love another person is impossible if you do not see in it the divine, akin to God, if you do not see God in it. „Man to man is God – that is the higher practical basic principle“ [8, p. 308]. Feuerbach considers it to be lost in Christianity. Morality in Christianity is made the criterion of religion, but morality itself is subordinated to religion. God prevails over morality. Man thanks God for the blessings for him from another person, but doesn't thank the person. „In this way, – Feuerbach exclaims, – the morale of religion dies“ [8, p. 310]. Morality unlike religion doesn't separate, but unites people, being the true basis of religion and manifestation of true piety.

When for Kant religion is the embodiment of morality, its completion, for Feuerbach morality as the moral attitude of one person to another, is the true meaning of religion. Morality is religion, they are identical. And if Kant's morality is the essence of religion, it is, so to say, the idea of a religion – the fullness of morality, for Feuerbach, morality itself (and not “in itself”, as for Kant), that is, taken in empirical terms, is a true religion. “Feuerbach adores simple laws of human coexistence and morality” [2, p. 329], makes empirical ethics absolute. It strongly exacerbates Kant's assertion that knowledge of God adds nothing to the morality of man, and argues that faith is opposed to love, being in fact immoral. Finally, L. Feuerbach offers a vast concept of transformation of philosophy. “The old philosophy had a double truth: the truth for itself, which did not care about the person – such is a philosophy, – and the truth for man – that is religion. In addition, the new philosophy as a human philosophy is essentially a philosophy for man; without affecting the dignity and autonomy of the theory, even in complete harmony with it, the philosophy has in fact a practical tendency, while practical in the highest sense; it stands instead of religion, it involves religion, it is truly – religion itself” [7, p. 204]. Moral philosophy should become the basis for true religion. Philosophy should replace religion. Remaining

itself, philosophy must include all the benefits of religion. It is intended to become not only theoretical comprehension, but also a guide to happy life.

Conclusions.

The German classical philosophy clearly claimed the priority of morality over religion. This advantage in its extreme expression means that the idea of God is valuable only when promotes the moral improvement of man. In religion a person depends on God, but ultimately God himself depends on the person. God must be moral, and religion in its essence is nothing but morality. Morality is the true religion. The moral law is God.

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